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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a consolidated appeal from the district court's order denying Dana 
Smith's Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence (No. 42962-2015) and from 
the order denying his Motion for a New Trial (No. 42963-2015). R 75. The district 
court erred in denying Mr. Smith's Rule 35(a) motion because the illegality of the 
sentence is apparent on the face of the record. Alternatively, the trial court erred 
because it denied the motion without ruling on the motion for appointment of 
counsel. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
1. Prior proceedings 
In 2007, Dana Smith was convicted of grand theft after a jury trial. The 
district court imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years with seven years 
determinate. The judgment of conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. 
State u. Smith, Docket Nos. 35216/35604 (Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished). Mr. Smith 
filed a motion for a Farettai hearing and motion to alter or amend judgment. The 
district court denied both motions and affirmed on appeal. State u. Smith, No. 38197 
(Ct. App. 2011) (unpublished). 
In 2012, Mr. Smith filed a prose motion for a new trial. The district court 
denied the motion as untimely. On appeal, Mr. Smith contended that the trial court 
1 Faretta u. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
1 
have extended the time limit for the filing of his motion under LC. § 19-2407, 
provides that the "application for a new trial may be made before or after 
judgment; and must be made within the time provided by the Idaho criminal rules 
unless the court or judge extends the time." The Court of Appeals disagreed, 
holding that "by terms of Rules 34 and 45, the time within which to file a motion for 
a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence may not be enlarged." State 
u. Smith, 154 Idaho 581, 582, 300 P.3d 1069, 1070 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied 
(2013). 
Mr. Smith filed another motion for a new trial and argued that I.C.R. 34 was 
unconstitutional as applied in his case. The Court refused to address the 
constitutional argument because: 
This argument could have been raised in his sixth motion for a new 
trial, but Smith failed to raise it at that time. Therefore, Smith is 
precluded from raising this claim as he already raised the [substantive] 
claim in his sixth motion for a new trial and this Court concluded that 
the district court properly denied the motion based on the lack of 
jurisdiction. 
State u. Smith, No. 4094 7 (Ct. App. 2014) (unpublished), cert. dismissed, 135 S. Ct. 
202 (2014). The substantive basis for the motion was also not reached by the Court 
of Appeals. 
2. Motion for appointment of counsel and motion for a new trial 
On January 16, 2015, Mr. Smith filed another motion for a new trial, a Rule 
35 motion, and a motion for appointment of counsel. R 28, 32, 50. In the new trial 
motion, he argued that the court erred in a matter oflaw when it permitted Mr. 
2 
to proceed to trial without first determining whether he was competent to 
R32. 
Mr. Smith was correct in his factual assertion. The record from No. 35216 
shows that Judge John Melanson ordered an I.C. § 18-211 competency evaluation. 
T (No. 35216) (April 10, 2007), pg. 52, ln. 1-9.2 Richard V. Smith, Ph.D. did the 
evaluation and wrote: 
His ability to assist in his own defense presents a question, however. 
He can and does ramble off rather inappropriately, both in terms of 
content and style intermittently. In my view that likely seriously 
impairs his ability to work systematically with his attorney in a 
sustained fashion. That is, there are brief periods in which he appears 
to be very lucid and very much on target. However, as indicated, 
intermittently he gets off target, is fairly irrational, bizarre, and 
grandiose. In those regards, [i]t is my opinion that he cannot 
effectively and systematically work with his defense attorney in a 
sustained fashion. 
Smith Report, pg. 8 (in PSI3). Dr. Smith went on to say: 
In my opinion this examinee does not need to be rehospitalized. He 
can in all likelihood be treated safely on an outpatient basis and should 
resume medications to stabilize his mood. That being the case, once 
those medications would become effective then he could in all 
likelihood proceed with the matters in court that he is currently facing. 
Id. Dr. Smith believed that Mr. Smith was incompetent to stand trial because he 
could not assist his attorney in a rational manner, but that he could be returned to 
competency once he was stabilized on his medications. 
2 A motion for this Court to take judicial notice of its file in No. 35216 is filed 
contemporaneously herewith. 
3 The Amended Notice of Appeal asked that the PSI be forwarded to the 
Court as an Exhibit. R 82. 
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Dr. Smith's report was dated May 2, 2007. On June 4, 2007, Mr. Smith's 
Dennis Byington, told the Court, when Mr. Smith was not present, that 
J\fr. Smith "had been found to be not competent in aiding in his own defense to a 
certain degree." T (No. 35216) (June 4, 2007) pg. 69, ln. 12 - pg. 70, ln. 7. He went 
on to tell the Court that Mr. Smith was on the "medication that they have 
prescribed" and asked that a trial date be set. Id. Thus, Mr. Smith is correct that 
he never had a competency hearing, nor was Mr. Smith's fitness to proceed 
"determined by the court," as required by I.C. § 18-212(1).4 
The district court denied the motion for new trial as untimely. R 57-58. The 
court never ruled on the motion for appointment of counsel. 
3. Rule 35 motion 
On the same day he filed his motion for appointment of counsel and for a new 
trial, Mr. Smith also filed a prose Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence. 
He argued that "[t]he sentence is illegal and should be changed" because he was 
tried, convicted and sentenced while mentally incompetent. R 51. He also argued 
that the court did not order a psychiatric exam pursuant to LC. § 19-2522 and that 
4 Thus, the Court of Appeals previously misstated the record when it wrote 
that, "The record demonstrates that Smith did receive a psychiatric evaluation, as 
ordered by the district court, pursuant to I.C. § 18-211, and was found competent to 
proceed to trial once provided with medication." State v. Smith, No. 40947, 2014 
WL 505140, at *4. In fact, the doctor found that Mr. Smith "could in all likelihood" 
be returned to competency with proper medication. As noted above, the trial court 
never held a hearing to determine whether Mr. Smith had been given the 
appropriate medications or whether he had actually returned to competency before 
commencing trial, so it cannot be said that he was "found competent" to proceed. 
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court did not take his mental illness into consideration at sentencing. Id. 
The district court denied the motion, writing that: 
A Rule 35(a) motion may be brought at any time, but may only be 
brought to correct a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record. 
Smith does not contend that his sentence was illegal from the face of 
the record; he wants to delve into the record, claiming that his 
sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. I.C.R 35(b) applies to 
sentences imposed in an illegal manner. Therefore, his motion falls 
under Rule 35(b) and not Rule 35(a). Rule 35(b) motions must be 
brought within 120 days of the filing of a judgment of conviction. 
Smith's judgment of conviction for CR-2004-2628 was filed on 03/31/08. 
Six years have now passed. Therefore, this motion is untimely and the 
defendant's motion is DENIED. 
R 53-54. 
Again, the court did not rule on the motion to appoint counsel prior to ruling 
on the Rule 35 motion. 
A notice of appeal from the denial of the Rule 35 motion was timely filed, R 
65, as was a notice of appeal from the order denying the motion for a new trial. R 
69. An amended notice of appeal was also filed. R 81. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Is a sentence imposed upon a defendant who has been found to be 
incompetent to stand trial but never found to have been restored to competency an 
illegal sentence which can be corrected at any time under I.C.R. 35(a)? 
B. Alternatively, did the court err in failing to rule on the motion for 
appointment of counsel in light of the meritorious Rule 35(a) motion? 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The district court erred in finding the Rule 35 ,notion to be 
brought under subsection (b) instead of (a) and consequently erred by 
denying the motion for being untimely. 
1. Standard of review 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) provides, that "ft!he court may correct a sentence 
that is illegal from the face of the record at any time." The term "illegal sentence" is 
not defined, nor is the term "face of the record." In considering "the interpretation 
of a criminal rule, this Court exercises free review." State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 
82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009), quoting, State u. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 175, 177 
P.3d 387, 389 (2008). 
2. Argument 
The sentence is illegal because it violates I.C. § 18-210. That statute provides 
that "[n]o person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to 
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be 
tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense so long as 
such incapacity endures." (Emphasis added.) This is not a claim that the sentence 
was imposed in an illegal manner, as found by the district court. Mr. Smith's 
motion, in relevant part, challenged the court's power to impose a sentence at all. It 
was, therefore, properly brought as a 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
Moreover, the illegality of the sentence is apparent from the face of the 
record. The "face of the record" requirement was first announced in State v. 
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supra, where the Court wrote: 
Therefore, the term "illegal sentence" under Rule 35 is narrowly 
interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record, i.e., 
does not involve significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary 
hearing. .... Because an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time, 
the authority conferred by Rule 35 should be limited to uphold the 
finality of judgments. Rule 35 is not a vehicle designed to reexamine 
the facts underlying the case to determine whether a sentence is 
illegal; rather, the rule only applies to a narrow category of cases in 
which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by 
law or where new evidence tends to show that the original sentence 
was excessive. 
State u. Clements, 148 Idaho at 86,218 P.3d at 1147 (2009) (emphasis added). 
(Subsequent to Clements, the Court amended the Criminal Rule to conform to the 
caselaw.) 
Mr. Smith's motion meets all of the Clements requirements. The record 
plainly shows that Mr. Smith was found to be incompetent and the trial court never 
found he had been restored to competency. Therefore, the court was barred by I.C. § 
18-210 from sentencing him or otherwise punishing him. The absence of a hearing 
where Mr. Smith was found to have returned to competency is apparent from the 
face of the record. One did not occur. 
This case is much different than Clements. There, the defendant claimed 
that a second firearm enhancement was illegal because the two substantive offenses 
"arose out of the same indivisible course of conduct." That determination, however, 
required "a significant factual finding that the court was only able to make after 
reviewing testimony from the preliminary hearing." Accordingly, Clement's 
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sentence was not illegal from the face of the record. Compare also, State v. Wolfe, 
55, 66, 343 P.3d 497, 508 (2015) (Rule 35(a) relief not available in case 
which "involve[d] very significant questions of fact that cannot be resolved from the 
face of the judgment: whether the victim was in fact Native American and whether 
the crime occurred on a reservation."); and State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 610, 613, 
226 P.3d 552, 555 (Ct. App. 2010) (claim of illegality based upon "assertion ... that 
his attorney did not advise him of his Fifth Amendment right to decline 
participation in the psychosexual evaluation" could not be determined from face of 
record). 
This case is more like State v. McKinney, 15~"3 Idaho 837, 291 P.3d 1036, 
(2013). There, the district court correctly reached the merits of a double jeopardy 
claim raised in a Rule 35(a) motion because the issue could be "determined merely 
by examining the respective statutes defining those crimes" and from "the face of 
the record simply by reading the information charging each crime." McKinney, 153 
Idaho at 841, 291 P.3d at 1040. Here, a review of the Register of Actions would 
show no competency hearing was ever held. 
The district court erred when it concluded that" Smith does not contend that 
his sentence was illegal from the face of the record; he wants to delve into the 
record, claiming that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner." R 53-54. 
While, the 35(b) portion of the motion may have required "delving into the record," 
the 35(a) portion did not. 
In addition, Mr. Smith's case fits into that "narrow category of cases" which 
8 
be addressed in a 35(a) motion. Mr. Smith was sentenced in violation of I.C. § 
10. He was found to be incompetent to stand trial and was never found to have 
been restored to competency. Thus, the sentence "is simply not authorized by law" 
and therefore "illegal" under Rule 35(a). Clements, supra. 
3. Conclusion 
Mr. Smith's pro se motion raised a valid Rule 35(a) claim. Therefore, it was 
timely. The illegality was apparent from the face of the record. And, any sentence 
imposed on an incompetent person is simply not authorized by law, is illegal and 
may be corrected under Rule 35(a). The court erred in denying the motion and this 
Court should reverse the order and vacate the sentence. 
B. Alternatively, the district court erred in denying Mr. Smith's 
motion for appointment of counsel prior to ruling on the pending motions. 
Even if this Court is not yet convinced of the merits of the Rule 35(a) motion, 
or finds that the motion was not adequately raised in the prose pleading, the order 
denying the motion should still be vacated and the case remanded because the court 
failed to rule on Mr. Smith's motion for appointment of counsel. A needy person has 
the right to be represented by counsel in any post-commitment proceeding that the 
needy person considers appropriate, "unless the court in which the proceeding is 
brought determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with 
adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a 
frivolous proceeding." I.C. § 19-852(b)(3); see also State u. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 
523-24, 873 P.2d 167, 168-69 (Ct. App. 1994). In reviewing the denial of a motion 
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appointment of counsel in post conviction proceedings, the "Court will not set 
the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to 
questions of law, th[eJ Court exercises free review. Brown u. State, 135 Idaho 676, 
678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001). 
Here, the district court never ruled on the motion for appointment of counsel. 
That was error. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792-93, 102 P.3d 1108, 
1111-12 (2004). In Charboneau, the court failed to rule on the request for 
appointment of counsel prior to deciding the substantive issues contained in the 
petition. The Supreme Court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further 
proceedings, writing that "the district judge should have first determined whether 
Charboneau was entitled to court-appointed counsel before denying the 
post-conviction relief on its merits," noting that "[t]he Court of Appeals has ruled 
that when a district court is presented with a request for appointed counsel, the 
court must address this request before ruling on the substantive issues in the case." 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho at 792-93, 102 P.3d at 1111-12, citing Fox v. State, 
129 Idaho 881, 934 P.2d 947 (Ct. App. 1997); Ortiz v. State, 124 Idaho 67, 856 P.2d 
104 (Ct. App.1993); Henderson v. State, 123 Idaho 51, 844 P.2d 33 (Ct. App.1992). 
Here, the court erred because it did not rule on the motion to appoint counsel 
prior to dismissing the substantive motions. In this case, the failure to rule on the 
motion to appoint counsel was not harmless because the Rule 35 motion was 
actually brought under both I.C.R. 35(a) and (b), so the portion brought under (a) 
10 
was timely. 
addition, the trial court could not have denied counsel by determining that 
the Rule 35(a) motion was frivolous. 
Idaho Code § 19-852(b)(3) sets forth the standard for determining 
whether or not a post-conviction proceeding is frivolous. It is frivolous 
if it is "not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means 
would be willing to bring at his own expense." When applying that 
standard to prose applications for appointment of counsel, the trial 
court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a prose 
petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete. Although facts 
sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because they do not exist, 
they also may not be alleged because the prose petitioner simply does 
not know what are the essential elements of a claim. 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112 . 
Applying the above standards to this case, it would have been error for the 
court to deny the motion for appointment of counsel. Mr. Smith's prose motion 
raised a valid Rule 35(a) claim and was timely. The illegality was apparent from 
the face of the record and the sentence was not authorized by law. 
Even if the Court does not grant the requested Rule 35(a) relief, it still must 
vacate the order denying the motion and remand with directions for the court to 
appoint counsel. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court and 
vacate the sentence as it is illegal. 
DATED thi;J;t.ty of December, 2015. 
~ --~ 
1 J,ib<A,S ~CrV~ 
Dennis Benjamin d 
Attorney for Dana Smith 
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